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HOW UNITED STATES V. JONES CAN RESTORE
OUR FAITH IN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Erica Goldberg*†
United States v. Jones,1 issued in January of this year, is a landmark case
that has the potential to restore a property-based interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment to prominence. In 1967, the Supreme Court abandoned its previous Fourth Amendment framework, which had viewed the prohibition on
unreasonable searches in light of property and trespass laws, and replaced it
with a rule protecting the public’s reasonable expectations of privacy.2 Although the Court may have intended this reasonable expectations test to
provide more protection than a test rooted in property law, the new test in
fact made the Justices’ subjective views about privacy paramount, resulted
in circular logic, and over time diminished Fourth Amendment protection.
Jones, which held that attaching a GPS device to a suspect’s car without a
proper warrant violates the Fourth Amendment because attachment of the
device constitutes a physical intrusion upon the car,3 reinvigorates the pre1967 property-based framework. The case indicates that a governmental
intrusion is a search if it violates a reasonable expectation of privacy or constitutes a physical intrusion of property. Jones is itself rather limited in
scope, but it could provide the foundation for a paradigm shift in the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
Most of the commentary on Jones has focused on the impact of the decision on the scope of Fourth Amendment rights. However, Jones’s potential
impact is far broader than outcomes in particular Fourth Amendment cases.
Jones should restore our faith in the Fourth Amendment—not necessarily
because it is more protective of Fourth Amendment rights, but because it
gives the Justices a more concrete framework to determine whether the government has executed a search. Because Jones has supplemented the
reasonableness inquiry with a physical trespass test, the determination of
whether government action constitutes a search can be based on objective
factors. Over time, this should make the results of Fourth Amendment cases
more predictable and defensible and perhaps will reduce much of the cynicism surrounding Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Jones is hardly the last word in the evolution of Fourth Amendment doctrine. As the concurrence in Jones points out, Jones itself does not apply to
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Penn State University Dickinson School of Law; J.D.
Stanford University; B.A. Tufts University.
† Suggested Citation: Erica Goldberg, Commentary, How United States v. Jones Can
Restore Our Faith in the Fourth Amendment, 110 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 62 (2012),
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/110/goldberg.pdf.
1. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-1259).
2. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
3. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 946.
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the common scenario where the government engages in intrusive behavior
that does not involve physical intrusion onto property (e.g., utilizing GPS
technology to track the location of an individual’s cell phone).4 For now,
such intrusions are examined only under the “reasonable expectations” test.
However, if the Court fully embraces the logic of Jones, such intrusions
could be considered searches, regardless of whether any particular Justice
believes the government’s action to be reasonable, because they rise to the
level of trespass to chattels.
A. The Pre-Jones Test for Searches
The Fourth Amendment’s ban on “unreasonable searches and seizures”5
offers little guidance to judges on how to protect individuals from overzealous criminal investigations. The text does not provide any coherent
principles for determining when a search or seizure is unreasonable, or even
whether a search or seizure has occurred at all. As a result, the Supreme
Court has been sharply divided on questions as fundamental as the nature of
the right being protected by the Fourth Amendment and whether this right
sounds in concerns for property or privacy.
Assessing the constitutionality of a purported search occurs in two stages. First, the court must determine whether the government’s action
constitutes a “search,” requiring Fourth Amendment protection. The Fourth
Amendment thus does not apply to a wide swath of intrusive government
action that cannot be deemed a search. Once government action is considered a search, the court then analyzes whether the search is reasonable. This
analysis, which often involves a balancing of the individual privacy interest
at stake against the government’s reason for performing the search, has allowed “a shifting majority of th[e Supreme] Court the authority to answer
all Fourth Amendment questions by consulting its momentary vision of the
social good.”6
Over the past several decades, the Justices have rightfully expressed
cynicism about the analysis used to adjudicate our Fourth Amendment
rights. Prior to United States v. Jones, the threshold question of whether a
governmental intrusion was deemed a search depended solely on the highly
subjective question, first articulated in Katz v. United States, of whether the
government had intruded upon a reasonable expectation of privacy. Like
Jones, Katz effectuated a paradigm shift in understanding the basis for our
Fourth Amendment rights. By holding that attaching an electronic surveillance device to a public telephone booth constitutes a search for which the
government must first obtain a warrant even though there was no physical
trespass, the Supreme Court in Katz discarded a textual analysis of the
Fourth Amendment based on property rights and instead hinged the
Amendment upon evolving notions of privacy.
4.
5.
6.

Id. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring).
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 370 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Previously, the textualist and originalist interpretations of the Fourth
Amendment had defined searches as intrusions upon physical property. This
is because the Fourth Amendment explicitly protects “persons, houses, papers, and effects,” and the common law at the time of the Framing
concerned itself with protecting property rights against the ransacking of
houses by the government.7 Olmstead v. United States, later repudiated by
Katz, had held that tapping telephone wires on public streets did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search because “[t]here [i]s no entry of the houses
or offices of the defendants.”8 Breaking from tradition, Katz held that the
Fourth Amendment is instead concerned with protecting the individual from
infringements upon an “expectation of privacy . . . . that society is prepared
to recognize as ‘reasonable.’ ”9
Katz was intended to broaden Fourth Amendment protections and unmoor it from Olmstead’s rigid connection to property. The dissenting
Justices in Olmstead believed that wedding the Fourth Amendment to property rights was misguided in an era where technological advancements
could mean great intrusions into personal privacy without any physical trespass.10 However, reliance on the value-laden notion of “reasonable
expectation of privacy” actually has eroded Fourth Amendment rights and
our faith in the Fourth Amendment’s ability to provide meaningful protection. The Justices have sparred about what privacy rights citizens reasonably
expect. The Court has resorted to the use of balancing tests, and often the
government’s interest in investigating and deterring crime has won out over
the individual’s interest against unreasonable intrusions.11 In a series of cases, the Court held that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy (1) in
private fields, fenced in and guarded by a no-trespassing sign,12 (2) in an
individual’s garbage in opaque bags left on the curb for the trash collector,13
and (3) when a helicopter flew 400 feet above an individual’s mobile
home.14 If the Court had used a Fourth Amendment framework based on
invasions of property, the result of these cases might have been quite different. The Court could have determined, for instance, that garbage remains
7.
8.
9.
10.

See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463 (1928).
Id. at 464.
See United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead, noted that

[t]he progress of science in furnishing the government with means of espionage is not
likely to stop with wire tapping. Ways may some day be developed by which the government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and
by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the
home.

Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). “Can it be,” he asked, “that the Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of individual security?” Id.
11. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 151–53 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
12. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
13. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
14. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
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one’s property so long as it sits on one’s curb for exclusive transfer to the
garbage collector. Regardless of the outcome, using a property-based
approach would certainly have put the Court’s opinion on a firmer foundation that would have allowed it to render decisions based on generally
applicable rules instead of ad hoc analysis. The Court could have determined that flying a helicopter at 400 feet above someone’s home did not
constitute a trespass because helicopters are permitted into that airspace and
because “there [i]s no undue noise, and no wind, dust, or threat of injury.”15
Instead, the Court based its decision on the public being legally permitted to
fly at that low of an altitude over someone’s home, but could (or would) not
hold “that an inspection of the curtilage of a house from an aircraft will always pass muster under the Fourth Amendment simply because the plane is
within the navigable airspace specified by law.”16
Perhaps worse than curtailing our Fourth Amendment protections,
Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test became a way for the Justices
to appoint themselves arbiters of which privacy expectations to afford society. Instead of determining whether privacy expectations were reasonable,
based on empirical notions of when most citizens regard their possessions or
conversations as being private, the Justices applied Katz normatively, based
on how privacy should operate. Justice Harlan, whose concurring opinion in
Katz established the reasonable expectation of privacy test, later wrote,
“[s]ince it is the task of the law to form and project, as well as mirror and
reflect, we should not, as judges, merely recite the expectations and risks
without examining the desirability of saddling them upon society.”17 By deciding when the government had intruded upon a reasonable expectation of
privacy, the Justices had assigned themselves the power to dictate to society
when society’s assumptions about privacy were acceptable. This normative
view could be both broader and narrower than society’s actual expectations
of privacy, and decisions were often based on the Justices’ own experiences,
which may have been similar to each other’s but which were not the norm
for society.18
Of course, the Justices have differed on the normative question of when
individuals should be permitted to assume that their possessions and conversations are private. In California v. Greenwood, for instance, the majority
believed that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s garbage left on the curb outside one’s home, because “[i]t is common
knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street
are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other
15. Id. at 452.
16. Id. at 451.
17. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
18. See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F. 3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“No truly poor people are appointed as federal
judges, or as state judges for that matter. Judges, regardless of race, ethnicity or sex, are selected from the class of people who don't live in trailers or urban ghettos. The everyday
problems of people who live in poverty are not close to our hearts and minds because that’s
not how we and our friends live.”).
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members of the public.”19 The dissent contended instead that “scrutiny of
another’s trash is contrary to commonly accepted notions of civilized behavior.”20 Justice Brennan in dissent argued that “members of our society will
be shocked to learn that the Court, the ultimate guarantor of liberty, deems
unreasonable our expectation that the aspects of our private lives that are
concealed safely in a trash bag will not become public.”21
By the Justices’ own design, there is no touchstone for determining
whether the dissent or the majority had the correct position in Greenwood.
The question of whether we have a reasonable expectation of privacy in any
dimension of our lives was, prior to Jones, entirely circular. If the Supreme
Court held that individuals had no reasonable expectation of privacy in their
garbage, for example, then individuals could not reasonably assume that
their garbage was secure against warrantless, suspicionless police intrusion.
We could reasonably expect privacy from police intrusions only when the
Court deemed our expectations of privacy are reasonable.
B. Justice Scalia’s New (Old) Approach
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Jones, over a four-judge concurrence
authored by Justice Alito, consolidated the competing approaches of
Olmstead and Katz. A search now occurs either when there is a state-law
trespass upon property, as in Olmstead, or when the government infringes
upon a reasonable expectation of privacy, per Katz. The majority opinion in
Jones thus resurrects the pre-Katz link between the Fourth Amendment and
property rights without changing the rule that the Fourth Amendment is also
violated by intrusions upon privacy. According to Justice Scalia, “We have
no doubt that such a physical intrusion [as attaching a GPS device to an individual’s car] would have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”22 The majority’s return to a
textual and historical analysis of the Fourth Amendment has the potential to
force the Justices to answer to something more concrete than the “reasonableness” standard. This opinion adds much needed clarity and objectivity to
Fourth Amendment analysis. By focusing on property rights, the Justices
may now use property intrusions as a proxy for when privacy has been unconstitutionally violated.
Ironically, to achieve this properly principled framework, the opinion
distorts precedent in unrecognizable ways, without ever acknowledging that
it is doing so. As Justice Alito notes in his concurrence, the connection between the Fourth Amendment and property was abandoned in United States
v. Katz, and it “has little if any support in current Fourth Amendment case

19.
20.
21.
22.

California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988).
Id. at 45 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 46.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) .
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law.”23 The Court previously noted that it had “decoupled violation of a
person’s Fourth Amendment rights from trespassory violation of his property.”24
To be fair, the Court in prior cases has looked to property law in assessing whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists (or whether a
search is reasonable),25 but Justice Scalia’s major contribution in Jones is
holding that a physical trespass in and of itself, when performed to acquire
information, constitutes a search regardless of reasonable expectations of
privacy. Although the Jones test is currently a supplement to the Katz test,
this move away from the normative reasonableness inquiry will render
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence more certain for individuals, police officers, and judges, and ultimately may prove more protective of Fourth
Amendment rights. The results in any particular case may still require courts
to exercise their own judgment and interpretation of property rights, but
their decisions will be guided by something other than their own personal
evaluations of reasonableness.
C. Beyond the Physical
As Justice Alito remarks, Justice Scalia’s addition of the more definitive
physical trespass test provides no extra protection against nonphysical
searches, such as GPS tracking performed through cell phones. Concerns
like Justice Alito’s regarding non-physical searches are what led the Katz
majority to abandon the property-based framework. Perhaps the best solution to this problem is the one presented by Justice Alito himself. Although
Justice Alito disputes this, a historical understanding of the Fourth Amendment is not inconsistent with an updating of society’s notions of property
rights. The Justices can undertake a property-based Fourth Amendment
analysis, as intended by the Framers, while incorporating modern-day property law, which applies to electronic trespasses such as spamming one’s
email account.26 Justice Alito recognizes that courts have held that “the

23. Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring). In Greenwood, for example, the Court did not
examine whether an individual’s trash is abandoned property because “the reach of the Fourth
Amendment is not determined by state property law.” 486 U.S. at 51 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
24. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001).
25. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006) (“The constant element in assessing Fourth Amendment reasonableness in the consent cases, then, is the great significance
given to widely shared social expectations, which are naturally enough influenced by the law
of property, but not controlled by its rules.”); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978)
(noting that an expectation of privacy is reasonable if it has “a source outside of the Fourth
Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society”).
26. Courts have held that sending spam email and using automated robots to download
information from websites can constitute a “trespass to chattels.” See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000); CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber
Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
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transmission of electrons that occurs when a communication is sent from
one computer to another is enough” to constitute trespass to chattels.27
Even in the Katz electronic surveillance case, the Court could have retained the connection between property rights and privacy rights by holding
that an electronic connection to an individual’s property (or to the phone
company’s property) is a physical intrusion, albeit on a microscopic level. In
Olmstead v. United States,28 overturned by Katz, the phone companies argued that wiretapping, even on lines outside one’s home, technically
trespasses upon telephone lines belonging to private phone companies and
devoted to the exclusive use of the callers.29 Similarly, Internet Service Providers (“ISP”) turning over emails stored or transmitted through an ISP’s
systems involves a trespass upon the ISP’s microchips.30 Justice Scalia’s
rationale, if updated to consider electronic penetration a form of trespass,
would permit the labeling of more intrusions as searches, whether they look
like traditional trespasses or modern-day, electronic trespasses.
One problem with this approach is that states might differ in what property rights they afford their citizens, while Fourth Amendment protections
must be uniform across the country. However, the Court could simply use a
physical-occupation test. There are also nonsubjective, empirical ways to
measure which property rights are the most frequently granted throughout
the country, have existed for the longest, or are in some way the most analogous to those contemplated by the Framers. The Fourth Amendment can be
interpreted using its historical connection to property while modernizing our
notions of property rights.
Conclusion
The best way to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights against political
pressures and shifting majorities’ notions of the social good is to make the
first prong of Fourth Amendment analysis—whether government action
constitutes a search—more concrete. Jones’s resurrection of the link between searches and property, though a significant and somewhat
disingenuous departure from precedent, is a substantial step toward this end.
Although Justice Scalia merely supplemented Katz’s reasonable expectation
of privacy test with Olmstead’s property-based approach and did not eradicate Katz entirely, further development of the jurisprudence and a more
explicit focus on property rights as an objective proxy for privacy expectations has the potential to diminish the subjectivity and circularity currently
plaguing Fourth Amendment analysis. Over time, especially if trespass to
chattels is considered a search, Jones may cover most of the territory
27. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
28. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
29. Sam Kamin & Ricardo J. Bascuas, Investigative Criminal Procedure: A
Contemporary Approach 15-16 (2011).
30. Instead, the Sixth Circuit decided a case involving these facts based on the Katz
formulation. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
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currently protected by Katz and could ultimately replace Katz as a clearer,
cleaner metric of when the Fourth Amendment is implicated. There is too
much room for debate about whether rifling through one’s garbage is “contrary to commonly accepted notions of civilized behavior,” but there is no
doubt that attaching a GPS device to Antoine Jones’ car constituted a physical intrusion upon his property.

